ABSTRACT: This paper provides evidence of horizon-dependent underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts. We find that when analysts revise their forecasts of both the current and subsequent quarter's earnings, neither revision is complete and the two-quarter-ahead earnings forecast revision is less complete than the one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast revision. This horizon-dependent restraint occurs in response to information in the previous quarter's earnings announcement and in response to other information available since the previous earnings announcement. We also propose a rational economics model of analyst forecasting behavior with predictions consistent with horizon-dependent underreaction. The paper provides intuition behind the model's key assumption that analysts incur asymmetric reputation costs when subsequent information causes them to revise earnings forecasts in a direction opposite their last forecast revision. Our economics-based explanation provides an alternative to the psychologybased explanations provided in prior literature and suggests avenues for further research.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon. Consistent with prior literature, we define underreaction in the statistical sense that forecasts updated in light of good (bad) news fall systematically below (above) upcoming earnings realizations. In other words, earnings forecasts do not move far enough in the direction of the unbiased implications of new information; i.e., analysts' response to the information is, on average, restrained or conservative. 1 Our results indicate that underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the time between the updated forecast and the upcoming earnings realization. We do not presume that underreaction in the statistical sense implies irrationality in the economic sense. In fact, later in the paper, we
propose a rational economics model of analyst forecasting behavior that, given certain reasonable assumptions about analysts' loss functions, implies horizon-dependent underreaction in analysts' forecasts.
This paper bridges several streams of prior empirical literature related to the rationality of analysts' earnings forecasts. Kang et al. (1994) find that the optimism bias in analysts' forecasts documented by O'Brien (1988) and others increases with the forecast horizon. Mendenhall (1991) and others find evidence suggesting that analysts' forecasts underreact to the implications of the news in earnings announcements for forecasts of upcoming earnings. Abarbanell (1991) and others find evidence suggesting that analysts' forecasts underreact to the implications of stock price information for upcoming earnings. Our paper provides evidence suggesting that:
(a) underreaction to information in stock prices is distinct from underreaction to information in earnings announcements; (b) underreaction and optimism bias in analysts' earnings forecasts are distinct phenomena; and (c) underreaction increases with the length of the forecast horizon in a manner similar to the horizon-dependent optimism bias documented by Kang et al. (1994) .
Our paper also contributes to literature seeking to explain apparent bias and underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts. Several papers suggest economic explanations for a systematic optimism or pessimism bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. Dugar and Nathan (1995) suggest that analysts issue optimistically biased forecasts to please managers of firms providing the analysts' brokerage firms with investment banking opportunities. Francis and Philbrick (1993) suggest that analysts issue optimistically biased forecasts in order to obtain inside information that improves analysts' buy-sell-hold recommendations. More recently, Brown (2001) and Matsumoto (2002) identify forecasting behavior consistent with managers' incentives to meet or barely beat analysts' forecasts; i.e., forecasts become slightly pessimistic as the earnings announcement date approaches. Thus, the relationships between analysts, the brokerage firms employing them and the firms whose earnings are the targets of the forecasts create economic incentives leading to systematically optimistic or pessimistic forecasts. These incentives do not, however, explain underreaction to new information.
Instead, explanations for underreaction invariably turn toward psychological biases in individual decision-making. For example, Elliott et al. (1995) suggest that underreaction stems from a judgmental bias in individual decision-making. 2 In addition, several laboratory studies suggest circumstances where psychological biases in individual decision-making potentially cause market-wide underreaction to new information (e.g., Maines and Hand, 1996; Calegari and Fargher, 1997) . If psychological biases in individual decision making persist in market settings, then markets are economically irrational. Our paper suggests an alternative economically rational explanation for underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts, which could in turn affect investors. Specifically, we demonstrate analytically that, if analysts have asymmetric loss functions, whereby the analyst's reputation suffers more when consecutive forecast revisions have opposite signs than when they have the same sign, then, consistent with our empirical results, analysts' forecasts rationally exhibit horizon-dependent underreaction to new information.
For example, consider a firm that, immediately after a quarterly earnings announcement, discloses a new strategic initiative that analysts believe will create higher earnings, and, therefore, analysts revise their earnings forecasts upward by some amount. If analysts immediately revise their earnings forecasts to the unbiased forecast of upcoming earnings, then there is an equal probability that subsequent information will cause the analyst to further revise the forecast upward or downward. We speculate that if, as the next earnings announcement date approaches, analysts must revise their forecasts downward (i.e., in the opposite direction of the prior forecast revision), then investors will perceive that new information has contradicted the analyst's interpretation of the effects of the firm's strategic initiative. On the other hand, if, as the next earnings announcement date approaches, analysts revise their forecasts upward (i.e., in the same direction as the prior forecast revision), then analysts can more easily convince investors that new information has confirmed their interpretation of the effects of the firm's strategic initiative. We speculate that, when investors perceive that additional information has confirmed (contradicted) analysts' interpretation of information related to upcoming earnings, the analyst's reputation capital increases (decreases). Thus, in order to maximize their reputation capital, analysts' restrain their response to new information, and this underreaction increases with uncertainty about the effects of additional information that may become available between the forecast revision date and the upcoming earnings announcement date. Since uncertainty regarding effects of new information likely increases with the time horizon between the forecast revision and the target earnings announcement date, underreaction increases with the length of this horizon.
The key variable in our study is the forecast horizon; i.e., the length of time between the forecast date and the earnings announcement date. Our empirical tests focus on situations where new information causes analysts to revise their forecasts of both current quarter and next quarter earnings for a given firm. We find that both forecasts underreact to the new information (in earnings announcements and in stock prices), but we find greater underreaction in the longerhorizon forecasts.
In addition to providing further insight into the behavior of analysts' earnings forecasts, our paper makes three methodological contributions. First, we develop an approach to examine analysts' response to information in earnings announcements separately from their response to other information released between quarterly earnings announcements. Although prior literature has examined both types of information, no prior study has effectively separated the analysis, such that evidence with respect to one type of information is uncontaminated by the other type.
Second, we develop an approach to separately examine the effect of the forecast horizon on optimism (or pessimism) bias versus underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts. This allows us to corroborate the results in Kang et al. (1994) that analysts become less optimistic as the forecast horizon decreases, while controlling for the horizon-dependent underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts. Finally, to mitigate econometric problems, we estimate all models at the firm level as opposed to the pooled cross-sectional approach used in prior studies documenting underreaction and horizon-dependent optimism in analysts' forecasts.
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Although we offer a rational economics explanation for the horizon-dependent underreaction that we observe using archival analyst forecast data, our study cannot rule out alternative psychology-based explanations for underreaction. Our study does, however, suggest a rational economics hypothesis that can be tested against psychology-based hypotheses in experimental economics laboratory settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews prior literature.
The third section describes our empirical models and research design. The fourth section describes the sample and data sources. The fifth section presents empirical results documenting horizon-dependent underreaction and optimism bias in analysts' forecasts. The sixth section proposes a theory of analyst forecasting behavior consistent with our empirical results, and the last section concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior empirical literature documents what appears to be analyst underreaction to two categories of information about future earnings: (1) earnings-surprise information, and (2) other earnings-related information. 4 For example, Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) find that Value Line analysts' quarterly forecast errors are serially correlated, and these researchers attribute this evidence to analyst underreaction to earnings news. Brown et al. (1985) , Lys and Sohn (1990) , Abarbanell (1991) and Ali et al. (1992) find that analysts' forecast errors and forecast revisions are related to lagged changes in stock prices, evidence which these authors attribute to analyst underreaction to recent information impounded in stock prices. Our research design (described in Section III) allows us to separately assess underreaction in analysts' responses to these two types of information.
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Prior literature also documents systematic bias in analysts' forecasts. The explanations in the literature for analyst underreaction to recent information differ from the explanations offered for the optimism or pessimism bias. The literature generally depicts optimism/pessimism biases in analysts' forecasts as intentional (Karamanou 2001) and due either to analysts' economic incentives to add some bias to their unbiased forecasts (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Das et al., 1998; Lin and McNichols, 1998) or to managers' incentives to guide analysts' forecasts downward (Brown 2001 , Matsumoto 2002 . 6 On the other hand, the literature referring to analyst underreaction generally speculates that this apparent irrationality stems from psychologically-based judgment errors in human information processing (e.g., Elliott et al. 1995, 920-21) . Francis and Philbrick (1993) refer to the underlying causes of underreaction as "processing" as opposed to "reporting" biases. As an alternative to the psychological explanations for underreaction, Section VI of this paper offers a rational economics explanation.
Our explanation of underreaction refers to different economic incentives than those driving explanations for the optimism or pessimism bias in analysts' forecasts. Kang et al. (1994) is the only prior study that directly evaluates whether bias in analysts'
forecasts depends on the forecast horizon. That study provides evidence that analysts' forecasts become less optimistically biased as the forecast horizon decreases. Given the distinctions between explanations for the optimism/pessimism bias in analysts' forecasts and explanations for underreaction, evidence that analysts become more optimistic as the forecast horizon lengthens does not necessarily imply that underreaction also increases with the forecast horizon. Our study evaluates whether the forecast horizon affects underreaction to earnings-surprise information, as previously identified, for example, by Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) ;
and whether the forecast horizon affects underreaction to other earnings-related information as 6 previously identified, for example, by Abarbanell (1991) , Lys and Sohn (1990) and Ali et al. (1992) . We develop an empirical model that simultaneously estimates horizon effects on the optimism bias and underreaction in analysts' forecasts.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
To evaluate whether bias and underreaction increase with the forecast horizon, we consider forecasts of both one-quarter-ahead earnings and two-quarter-ahead earnings. We consider forecasts issued during two time periods between quarterly earnings announcements.
The first period (early) includes forecasts dated during the 20 days following the previous quarterly earnings announcement and the second period (late) includes forecasts dated during the 40 days preceding the upcoming quarterly earnings announcement. For both early and late forecasts, our tests evaluate both optimism/pessimism bias and underreaction to the previous quarter's earnings surprise. For the late forecasts, we also evaluate underreaction to other earnings-related information in recent returns.
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Models
Underreaction to Earnings-Surprise Information
We use model (1) below to assess whether analyst underreaction to information in earnings announcements (earnings-surprise) increases with the forecast horizon. Prior papers suggest that analysts underreact to information about future earnings reflected in returns. However, the evidence in these papers generally does not preclude the possibility that the information reflected in returns is the same information available from earnings announcements. Lys and Sohn (1990) recognize this problem and conduct a sensitivity analysis to verify that the relation they observe between returns and subsequent earnings forecast errors is not due to analyst underreaction to information available from earnings announcements.
For a subset of the firms in their sample, Lys and Sohn restrict the return variable to periods that do not contain earnings announcements. However, they do not control for the relation between stock price changes and the previous quarter's earnings-surprise (i.e., post-earningsannouncement drift). Therefore, even in this subsample, the relation Lys and Sohn observe between the current quarter's forecast error and lagged changes in stock prices could, at least partially, be due to analyst underreaction to the previous quarter's earnings-surprise.
In their investigation of the relation between annual earnings forecast errors and prior returns Ali et al. (1992) also recognize the problem. Their research design controls for the prior year's earnings-surprise. However, their return accumulation window covers an entire year and, therefore, generally contains four quarterly earnings announcements. To distinguish analyst underreaction to information in stock returns from underreaction to information in earnings announcements, model (2) above combines the approaches used by Lys and Sohn (1990) and Ali et al. (1992) . We measure returns over a period falling between two quarterly earnings announcements, so our returns variable should not contain the market reaction to earnings surprise. As described above, to avoid the possibility that RET contains a delayed reaction to the quarter q earnings surprise, model (2) 
IV. SAMPLE AND DATA
The sample is restricted to firm-quarters from 1984 through 1999 with the necessary data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and the detailed I/B/E/S database to estimate the models described above. Also, to be included in the sample, each firm must have at least 10 quarterly observations with complete data during the 1984-1999 timeframe. The maximum is 47 quarterly observations available for the firms in our sample for purposes of estimating these models. The mean number of quarterly observations used to estimate the firm-level models is 18.9. These restrictions result in a sample of 451 firms with enough data to estimate the firm-level models. Our small sample size, relative to all firms with data on I/B/E/S, is due mainly to our requirement that each firmquarter have I/B/E/S analysts' one-quarter-ahead and two-quarter-ahead forecasts available within 20 calendar days after the previous quarter's earnings announcement and 40 days before the current quarter's earnings announcement.
Our models require estimates of: two consecutive quarterly earnings announcement dates (for quarters q and q+1); three consecutive actual earnings per share realizations (for quarters q, q+1 and q+2); at least one early and one late forecast of both quarter q+1 and quarter q+2 earnings; returns over the period from the 21 st day following the quarter q earnings announcement through the 41 st day preceding the quarter q+1 earnings announcement; and a stock price deflator as of the end of quarter q. We obtain returns and stock prices from CRSP, earnings announcement dates from COMPUSTAT, and forecasts and actual quarterly earnings data from I/B/E/S. 12 All variables are deflated by stock price as of the end of quarter q, and all data are adjusted for stock splits and dividends so as to maintain a common denominator across databases. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of price-deflated forecast errors, pooled over firmquarters in the 1984-1999 timeframe for the 451 firms in the I/B/E/S sample. 13 A systematic optimism bias, as measured by prior studies, is apparent for two-quarter-horizon forecasts. Both early and late forecasts of quarter q+2 earnings generate significantly negative forecast errors (i.e., mean and median FE t2 is significantly less than zero for both t=e and t=L). In the case of one-quarter-horizon forecasts, the mean is significantly negative but the median is significantly positive, showing some evidence that, for most observations in our sample, as the earnings announcement date approaches analysts move from an optimism bias to a small pessimism bias.
V. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
*******Insert Table 1 about here.*******
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 are also consistent with the results in Kang et al. (1994) , who find a horizon effect on analysts' optimism bias. The means of FE e2 -FE e1 and FE L2 -FE L1 are -0.0015 and -0.0020, both with p-values less than 0.01. That is, forecast errors computed with reference to both early and late forecasts are more negative when analysts are forecasting quarter q+2 earnings than when they are forecasting quarter q+1 earnings. This horizon effect on the mean forecast errors is also reflected in the significantly negative forecast revisions that occur from the early to the late forecast summarization periods (the mean of REV 1 is -0.0009, and the mean of REV 2 is -0.0004). Our tests described in Table 2 assess whether a horizon-dependent optimism bias persists, while controlling for underreaction in analysts'
forecasts. Table 2 reports results of simultaneously estimating optimism/pessimism bias and underreaction to earnings-surprise information. We report the results of first estimating model
Underreaction to earnings-surprise information
(1) at the firm level, and then assessing the median value from the distribution of the coefficient estimates across firms. As described above, significantly negative (positive) intercept coefficients from model (1) reflect analyst optimism (pessimism), and significantly positive slope coefficients reflect analyst underreaction to the quarter q earnings surprise.
14 Table 2 compares two-quarter-ahead versus one-quarter-ahead forecasts published early in the period between quarterly earnings announcements in terms of their optimism/pessimism bias and in terms of their underreaction to the previous quarter's earnings surprise. The coefficient measuring optimism/pessimism bias equals -0.0015 for two-quarter horizon forecasts and -0.0006 for one-quarter horizon forecasts. Thus, we estimate that two-quarter horizon forecasts following a quarterly earnings announcement contain more than twice the optimism as one-quarter horizon forecasts, and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. Likewise, the coefficient measuring underreaction to quarterly earnings surprise information equals 0.3309 for two-quarter horizon forecasts and 0.2460 for one-quarter-horizon forecasts. This suggests that approximately 24.6% (33.1%) of the quarter q forecast error persists as a predictable portion of the quarter q+1 (q+2) forecast error. Thus, we estimate approximately 35% (=33.1%/24.6%-1) more underreaction in two-quarter horizon forecasts than in one-quarter-horizon earnings forecasts, and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level.
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Overall, table 2 confirms the Kang et al (1994) evidence of horizon-dependent optimism bias in analysts earnings forecasts and provides new evidence that analysts' underreaction to earnings-surprise information increases with the forecast horizon.
*******Insert Table 2 about here.******* Underreaction to other earnings-related information reflected in returns Table 3 regarding the horizon effect on optimism bias and underreaction to earnings surprise correspond closely to the results reported in Table 2. 16 *******Insert Table 3 about here.******* Table 3 indicates that forecasts issued after the returns accumulation period underreact significantly to the implications of the returns information for predictions of both the upcoming quarter and the two-quarter-ahead earnings. Consistent with the evidence in Abarbanell (1991) and Lys and Sohn (1990) , this suggests that analysts underreact to information about future earnings reflected in price changes. In addition, we find that the underreaction to the implications for the longer horizon forecasts (λ L2 =0.0931) is significantly larger than the underreaction to the implications for the shorter horizon forecasts (λ L1 =0.0243). 17 Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that analysts underreact to both earnings surprise and other earnings-related information, and this underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. Tables 2 and 3 also confirm that the horizon effect on the optimism bias in analysts' forecasts, as documented by Kang et al. (1994) , persists when we control for underreaction in the forecasts.
Sensitivity analysis
As described above, the selection bias identified by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) or the form of optimism bias identified by Francis and Philbrick (1993) could create optimistically biased forecasts that have the appearance of underreaction in the case of bad news observations.
However, this would not be true for good news observations. Consequently, we examine the bias and underreaction to good news and bad news observations separately.
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We conduct the sensitivity analysis on both our tests of horizon-dependent underreaction to earnings surprise information and horizon-dependent underreaction to information reflected in returns. For the sensitivity analysis on our test of horizon-dependent underreaction to earnings surprise information, we include an indicator variable, BN, in equation 1, both by itself and interacted with SURPRISE. BN = 1 if the observation is a bad news observation. We use the sign of the quarter q+1 earnings forecast revision from the period preceding the earnings announcement for quarter q to the period immediately subsequent to the earnings announcement for quarter q to determine the BN variable (i.e., BN=1 for negative forecast revisions around the earnings announcement). For the analysis on our test of horizon-dependent underreaction to information reflected in returns we include an indicator, BNR, in equation 2, both by itself and interacted with RET. Here we use the sign of the quarter q+1 earnings forecast revision between the period immediately following the earnings announcement for quarter q and the period preceding the earnings announcement for quarter q+1 to define bad news observations (i.e., BNR=1 for negative earnings forecast revisions from the early to late forecast summarization period). 19 Since we continue to conduct our analysis at the firm-level and then assess the distribution of regression coefficient estimates across firms, we restrict the subsample to the 427 firms having at least 15% good news and 15% bad news observations. Table 4 panels A and B, respectively, provide the results of this sensitivity analysis.
As shown in panel A of table 4, both one-quarter-horizon and two-quarter-horizon earnings forecasts following good news are systematically optimistic, and, as in the full sample, the optimism bias increases with the forecast horizon. Specifically, the coefficients estimating optimism bias are -0.0002 and -0.0006 for one and two-quarter forecast horizons, respectively, and the difference is statistically significant. Similarly, early forecasts following good earnings news exhibit significant underreaction for both one-and two-quarter forecast horizons, and the underreaction increases significantly with the forecast horizon. Specifically, the underreaction coefficients for one-and two-quarter horizon forecasts following good news are 0.2411 and 0.3574, respectively, and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. This demonstrates that our results are not driven by the selection bias identified by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) or the form of optimism bias identified by Francis and Philbrick (1993) , since the underreaction (and the horizon effect) exist in good news observations. In addition, there is no significant incremental underreaction or horizon effect for bad news observations (row 4 of table 4, panel A). However, as suggested by Francis and Philbrick (1993) , there is a significant incremental optimism bias for bad news observations. The incremental optimism bias for one (two) quarter forecast horizons is -0.0002 (-0.0008), both significant at the 0.01 level.
Panel B of Table 4 provides similar evidence of horizon-dependent underreaction following good news. Specifically, the coefficients estimating underreaction to the information in returns are 0.0318 and 0.0590, respectively, for one-quarter-ahead and two-quarter-ahead forecasts and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. In addition, there is no incremental underreaction for bad news observations. In fact, in the one-quarter forecast horizon, there is actually significantly less underreaction for the bad news observations. Overall, it is clear that our results are not driven by an incorrect attribution of optimism bias to underreaction. underreaction is driven by a conservatism bias in processing recent information that runs counter to long-run trends. 21 These papers suggest that psychological biases at the individual decisionmaker level can persist in market settings and create biased market prices. As an alternative to psychology-based explanations for underreaction found in prior literature, this section introduces a rational economic explanation for our empirical evidence of horizon-dependent underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts.
VI. AN ECONOMIC EXPLANATION OF ANALYST UNDERREACTION
Assumptions
Consider an analyst competing with other analysts in a two-period world. The analyst develops reputation capital, R, in the first period, and reaps the benefits of that reputation in the second period. The benefits accrue from either trading commissions or the sale of independent research. We assume the following sequence of events:
1. As the first period opens, the analyst has an outstanding unbiased forecast, F 1 , of the firm's first period earnings, x. 4. Investors receive additional information, Y 2 , in the form of the earnings announcement, and determine the analyst's reputation capital, R, as described below.
If (x-F 2 )(F 2 -F 1 )<0, then p = ag. When the earnings announcement effectively reverses the analyst's assessment of the firm's prospects, the analyst may suffer a loss in reputation because it is more difficult for the analyst to put a positive spin on the reason for the earnings news, x-F 2 . However, if x-F 2 has the same sign as F 2 -F 1 , analysts can explain the news as confirming their previous assessment, thus enhancing their reputation.
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The results below demonstrate that the asymmetric loss function (a>b>1) creates an economic incentive for analysts to underreact to Y 1 , and this underreaction increases with the relative cost and risk associated with subsequent information creating a reversal of expectations.
Since risk of reversal increases with the forecast horizon, the underreaction also increases with the forecast horizon.
Analysis and results
As described below, there are three possible outcomes of the analyst's forecast decision based upon four different decision paths. Figure 1 depicts the conditions that determine the forecast outcome that maximizes expected reputation capital, E(R), given the magnitude, e, and uncertainty, u, reflected in the earnings-related news, Y 1 , and the asymmetric cost function described above. Figure 1 and the analysis below focus on the case of good news (e>0), but the results are perfectly symmetric to the case of bad news (e<0).
We model the analyst's expected reputation capital as:
where C represents the expected reputation loss, and
As described above, e represents the sign and magnitude of the news, u represents uncertainty of the upcoming earnings realization, x, around its mean, F 1 +e, and f(x)=1/(2u). The penalty, p, Since (5) is defined only over the range, F 2 >F 1 , as shown at the top of figure 1, F 2 * is in the analyst's choice set only when the underreaction coefficient, r(a-1)/(a+1), is less than one. In that case, (5) reaches a minimum at F 1 <F 2 * < F 1 + e, and we compare (6) and (4) to find the costminimizing forecast (either F 1 or F 2 * ). If a=1 or r=0, the analyst chooses F 2 * =F 1 +e, the unbiased forecast. Thus, there must be both cost (a>1) and risk (r>0) associated with subsequent information creating a reversal of expectations in order to create incentive for the analyst to underreact to Y 1 . In that case, whenever F 2 * is optimal, the amount of underreaction increases with a and r. Since uncertainty increases with the forecast horizon, this result is consistent with the horizon-dependent underreaction that we observe empirically. *******Insert Figure 1 about here.******* As shown in figure 1 , when (5) reaches a minimum over the range F 2 >F 1 , comparing (4) and (6) 
Comparing C(F 2 =F 1 ) in (4) to C(F 2 =F 1 +∆) in (7), we find that the analyst chooses 100% underreaction when b< [a(1-r) 2 +(1+r) 2 ]/[2(1+r 2 )]. The likelihood that this condition holds increases with r and a relative to b. 27 Thus, again, the probability of 100% underreaction increases with the relative uncertainty of the news and is, therefore, also consistent with the horizon-dependent underreaction observed in our empirical tests.
Discussion
As a way of summarizing the results above, figure 2 provides a graphical example of each of the four situations described above: (A) F 2 * is feasible [i.e., (5) Overall, our analysis shows that if an analyst's reputation capital suffers more for forecast inaccuracy accompanied by a reversal of expectations regarding future earnings as opposed to the penalty for inaccuracy accompanied by continued movement in the same direction as the prior forecast revision, analysts have an economic incentive to hold back (i.e., underreact) to the implications of information for earnings forecasts. We find that the underreaction increases with uncertainty relative to the magnitude of the new information, and with the relative cost of inaccuracy if subsequent information creates a reversal of expectations regarding the firm's earnings prospects. Since uncertainty increases with the forecast horizon, our theoretical results are consistent with our empirical evidence of horizon-dependent underreaction. The analysis above relates to good earnings news, but the results are perfectly symmetric to the case of bad news. That is, in the face of bad news (e<0), given the asymmetric cost function described in (3), analysts choose optimal cost-minimizing forecasts that fall in the range, F 1 +e and F 1 , inclusive.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings-surprise information and other earnings-related information reflected in stock price changes. Our evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and this underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. We also confirm the horizon-dependent optimism bias documented by Kang et al. (1994) , while controlling for horizon-dependent underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts.
Our paper also offers a theory that explains horizon-dependent underreaction, given the assumption that analysts' reputation capital suffers less (more) when new information causes forecast revision in the same (opposite) direction as the immediately prior forecast revision. The intuition underlying this assumption is that when new information leads an analyst to credibly revise a forecast in the same direction as the last forecast revision, investors are likely to assume the new information has confirmed the analyst's interpretation of the information that led to the last forecast revision. Whereas new information that leads an analyst to revise a forecast in the opposite direction as the last forecast revision more likely creates doubt about quality of the analyst's interpretation of the information that led to the last forecast revision. By reacting in a restrained manner to new information (i.e., underreacting), analysts can rationally create a greater likelihood that subsequent information becoming available between the time of the forecast and the earnings realization will cause them to revise their forecasts in the same, rather than the opposite, direction as their most recent forecast revision. The theory also predicts that the amount of underreaction rationally increases with the uncertainty regarding the effects of subsequent information. Since the uncertainty regarding the effects of subsequent information increases with the time until the target earnings realization, underreaction increases with the forecast horizon.
Our rational economics explanation for the horizon-dependent underreaction that we observe using archival analyst forecast data does not rule out alternative psychology-based explanations for underreaction. It does, however, suggest rational economics hypotheses that can be tested against psychology-based hypotheses in experimental economics laboratory settings.
APPENDIX Extension of Model of Analyst Underreaction to Normally Distributed Earnings Expectations
While earnings expectations generally have fat tailed distributions with virtually no uncertainty beyond some point in either direction, and, therefore, do not conform exactly to the normal distribution, the distributions are probably closer to normal than uniform. Therefore, this appendix extends our model of analyst underreaction to encompass the case of normally Again, we discuss the case of good news (i.e., e>0), but the results are exactly symmetric for bad news. The expected reputation capital R is:
where C represents the expected reputation loss, and for F 2 >F1 the cost function is: 2 Barberis et al. (1998) suggest that a similar judgmental conservatism bias (or restraint) in responding to new information affects investors' judgments and causes stock prices to underreact to new information.
3 Note that O'Brien (1988) introduces firm-level estimation in her study of analyst forecast accuracy, forecasting bias and the degree to which analysts' forecasts correspond to market expectations. However, she does not evaluate underreaction. Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Shane and Brous (2001) all document underreaction using pooled crosssectional data. Similarly, Kang, et al. (1994) document horizon-dependent optimism using pooled cross-sectional data.
4 Other earnings-related information refers to all information about future earnings not reflected by the unexpected portions of current or prior earnings announcements. Analysts might obtain other earnings-related information from conference calls, private discussions with management, weekly sales figures, etc. As described in Lundholm (1993, 1996) , such additional sources of corporate disclosures are important components of the information set affecting analysts' earnings forecasts. The other earnings-related information examined in our study is information reflected in stock price changes between earnings announcements.
5 Other papers examine the reaction of analysts' forecasts to specific earnings-related information events. For example, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) find that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to the information about future earnings contained in firms' announcements to split their stock.
6 Other recent papers (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; and Kasznik and McNichols, 2002 ) discuss the expectation management hypothesis that may result in biased forecasts. In addition, McNichols and O'Brien (1997) refer to a self-selection bias where analysts choose to follow or update forecasts for firms that they believe have good prospects and do not follow or update forecasts for firms that they believe have poor prospects. This economically-based selection bias causes the distribution of forecasts in archival databases to exhibit a systematic optimism bias.
7 We restrict our sample to firm-quarters with at least one forecast of both quarter q+1 and quarter q+2 earnings in both the early and late forecast summarization periods. Our rationale for cutting the time line is that in a normal 90-day period between earnings announcements, we want a reasonable gap between our early and late forecast summarization periods, while retaining enough observations to provide reasonable power in our tests. We decided on a gap of 30 days and on a late summarization period twice as large as the early period. The asymmetry is due to Stickel (1989) , who finds greater forecasting activity in the early period than the late period between earnings announcements. If we allow a 50 day gap and thus only 20 days in the late forecast period our number of observations drops dramatically.
8 We corroborate the information content of our SURPRISE variable by assessing its relation with market returns. We find that SURPRISE is significantly positively correlated with a 2-day return that begins on the day of the earnings announcement. Thus, SURPRISE contains information that the market considers value relevant.
9 We use median forecasts rather than, for example, the earliest forecast in the early period and the latest forecasts in the late period, because prior literature indicates that aggregation over a reasonably short time period improves forecast accuracy and provides a better proxy for market (and presumably analyst) expectations (Brown 1991, Brown and Kim 1991) . Our primary concern is that the median of forecasts in the early (late) forecast summarization period reflects analyst expectations before (after) the return accumulation period that occurs between the early and late forecast summarization periods. All models are estimated across quarterly observations at the firm-level. The firm j and quarter q subscripts are suppressed throughout the paper.
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We utilize the detailed I/B/E/S database and assume that dates assigned by I/B/E/S to individual analyst earnings forecasts correspond to the dates that the analysts formed their expectations based on all information available as of that point in time. We have no reason to believe that any error in this assumption differs between one-quarter-ahead and two-quarterahead earnings forecasts. Therefore, we do not believe this biases our findings regarding horizon effects on analyst underreaction and optimism bias.
11 We consider it unlikely that any additional bias added to (subtracted from) earnings forecasts following stock recommendation downgrades (upgrades) that accompany negative (positive) forecast errors would depend on the forecast horizon. Similarly, we consider any systematic optimism following bad news due to the selection bias identified by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) an unlikely cause for the horizon-dependent optimism that we observe using Model (1).
In order for this selection bias to affect our estimates of the effect of the forecast horizon on underreaction, the one-quarter-ahead earnings expectations of the analysts who choose to not update their forecasts or choose to not follow firms in the face of bad news would have to systematically exceed their two-quarter-ahead earnings expectations, and this difference would have to increase with the magnitude of the bad news.
12 We use the actual and forecasted earnings per share data definition (primary or fully diluted) that I/B/E/S views as more meaningful. For most firms this is primary earnings per share.
13
Observations containing values of any variable in the top or bottom 2.5% of that variable's distribution are removed from the analysis throughout the paper. Inferences are robust to 1% and 5% truncation rules, and to winsorizing rather than truncating the data.
14 Significance levels are based on Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the hypothesis that the median coefficient estimate across firms differs significantly from zero. Reported p-values are based on two-tailed tests. We also test the mean value from the distribution of coefficients. Results are qualitatively the same.
15 Differences between optimism/pessimism bias and underreaction in forecasts of quarter q+2 versus quarter q+1 earnings are the medians across firms in intercept and slope coefficients obtained from regressing the difference in forecast errors, FE e2 -FE e1 , on SURPRISE.
16 Note that the underreaction to the prior quarter's earnings surprise is smaller when measured using forecasts issued late in the period between earnings announcements. Specifically, the oneand two-quarter horizon underreaction coefficients decline from 0.2460 and 0.3309, respectively, as reported in table 2, to 0.0942 and 0.1861, respectively in table 3. This result implies that the prior quarter's earnings surprise is also related to forecast revisions from the early to the late period between earnings announcements, and these forecast revisions correct some but not all of the underreaction in analysts forecasts issued early in the period. The correction is relatively larger for one-quarter horizon versus two-quarter-horizon forecasts, but in both cases, the amount of the correction is statistically significant. indicator.
20 Similarly, Brown et al. (1985) (using IBES summary forecast data) and Shane and Brous (2001) (using Value Line data) find a relation between successive revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts. Shane and Brous interpret this evidence as suggesting that analysts underreact to information reflected in their own forecast revisions, much as they appear to underreact to the information reflected in their own forecast errors.
21 Edwards (1968, 18) describes laboratory experiments documenting conservatism as follows:
"It turns out that opinion change is very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes' theorem -but it is insufficient in amount. A convenient first approximation to the data would say that it takes anywhere from two to five observations to do one observation's worth of work in inducing a subject to change his opinions."
22 For expositional purposes, we assume a uniform distribution. The appendix extends the analysis to the case of a normal distribution and demonstrates that the asymmetric cost function described below implies horizon-dependent underreaction, regardless of whether x is uniformly or normally distributed. Research suggests that analysts' earnings forecast revisions influence stock prices even when the revision corrects prior underreaction (Shane and Brous, 2001 ). Therefore, underreaction followed by a forecast revision in the same direction can create trading profits for investors who follow the analyst's advice at the time of the first forecast revision. We are grateful to Sundaresh
Ramnath for suggesting this explanation of the asymmetric cost function that we propose.
26 When e>0 (i.e., good news), forecasts below F 1 are never cost minimizing. The cost function for F 2 <F 1 is: 
Whenever a>1, substituting any value of F 2 <F 1 into the expression above creates a higher cost than substituting any value of F 2 between F 1 and F 1 +e into the expression in equation (5), the cost function for F 2 >F 1 . 27 Theoretically, ∆ should be a positive and infinitely small movement which is not practically possible. But dC(F 2 )/dF 2 is strictly positive over the range F 1 <F 2 , when r>0 and a>(r+1)/(r-1).
Therefore, the comparison of reputation cost at F 1 and F 1 +∆ can be generalized to find the range, F 1 <F 2 <F 2 +he (h>0), over which the analyst can update to a forecast greater than F 1 and have a lower cost than the cost associated with maintaining F 1 . By substituting F 1 +he for F 2 on the rhs of (5) and setting the result equal to the rhs of (4), we find that h= [(1+a)+(1-a)r+[2b(1+a)+2(ab+b-2a) r 2 ] 0.5 ]/(a+1). The graph labeled (D) in figure 2 shows an example where F 1 +∆ is optimal. In that example, a=3, b=1.5 and r=3, resulting in h=0.37, and, for e=2, the analyst chooses the smallest feasible forecast between F 1 and F 1 +0.37*2.
28 For F2<F1, the cost function in (B1) becomes:
As in the uniform distribution case, the analyst will not issue a forecast less than F 1 , because:
(ii) the function reaches a minimum at the point, F 2 ′, where CDF(F 2 ′)=a/(a+1)>1/2, and, therefore, F 2 ′>F 1 +e=µ; (iii) when F 2 =µ, the cost functions for F 2 >F 1 and F 2 <F 1 produce the same result; and (iv) from (B2), the cost function for F 2 >F 1 always produces a minimum at a point less than or equal to µ. Intuitively, in the wake of good news, the analyst reduces (increases) the probability of incurring the higher cost ag by issuing a forecast between F 1 and F 2 (lower than F 1 ), and the expected value of the forecast error is also lower for forecasts between F 1 and µ as compared to forecasts less than F 1 . A: F 1 is optimal when F 2 * is feasible. a=2, b=1.1, r = 2.5, F 2 * =4.3. B: F 2 * is optimal when F 2 * is feasible. a=2, b=1.1, r=1.5, F 2 * =5. C: F 1 is optimal when F 2 * is infeasible. a=3, b=1.5, r=5, F 2 * =1. D: F 1 +∆ is optimal when F 2 * is infeasible. a=3, b=1.5, r=3, F 2 * =3.
(a) The reputation cost at each of the four possible forecast levels are demonstrated from line A to line D. In A and B, F 2 * is feasible so the optimal forecast will be either F 2 * or F 1 . In C and D, F 2 * is infeasible, so the optimal forecast level will be either F 1 or F 1 +∆. In the figure, ∆ and ◊ highlight the reputation loss at F 1 and F 2 * , respectively. F 1 =4, e=2, and g=1 across all the lines. (a) Variable definitions: SURPRISE = actual quarter q earnings per share minus the median I/B/E/S analyst forecast issued during the 40 days prior to the quarter q earnings announcement; FE tk = actual quarter q+k earnings per share minus the median analyst forecast issued either early (t=e) or late (t=L) in the period between the quarter q and quarter q+1 earnings announcements, where k=1 or 2 and early (late) is defined as the median analyst forecast issued within the 20 days following (40 days preceding) the quarter q (q+1) earnings announcement. SURPRISE and FE tk are deflated by stock price as of the end of quarter q. RET = average daily returns on firm j's common stock over the period from the 21 st day following the quarter q earnings announcement through the 41 st day prior to the quarter q+1 earnings announcement. All forecast and actual earnings per share data come from I/B/E/S, earnings announcement dates come from COMPUSTAT and stock price and return data come from CRSP. (c) The effects of the forecast horizon on underreaction and optimism/pessimism bias are measured by the differences, α e2 -α e1 and β e2 -β e1 , respectively. α e2 -α e1 and β e2 -β e1 are the medians across firms in intercept and slope coefficients obtained from regressing the difference in forecast errors, FE e2 -FE e1 , on SURPRISE. A negative intercept indicates α e2 <α e1 (i.e., more optimism bias in quarter q+2 versus quarter q+1 forecasts issued early in the period between the quarter q and quarter q+1 earnings announcements). A positive slope indicates β e2 >β e1 (i.e., more underreaction in quarter q+2 versus quarter q+1 forecasts issued early in the period between the quarter q and quarter q+1 earnings announcements). SURPRISE and RET. A negative intercept indicates α L2 <α L1 (i.e., more optimism bias in two-quarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts issued late in the period between earnings announcements). A positive slope coefficient on the SURPRISE variable indicates β L2 >β L1 (i.e., more underreaction to the implications of the quarter q earnings surprise for two-quarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts issued late in the period between earnings announcements). A positive slope coefficient on the RET variable indicates λ L2 >λ L1 (i.e., more underreaction to the implications of information in returns for two-quarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts). Late forecasts are defined as the median of the distribution of forecasts issued within 40 calendar days before the quarter q+1 earnings announcement (i.e., late in the period between the quarter q and quarter q+1 earnings announcements). RET measures returns accumulated between our early and late forecast summarization periods; i.e., from 21 days after the quarter q earnings announcement through 41 days prior to the quarter q+1 earnings announcement. defined by the sign of the revision in quarter q+1 earnings forecasts around the quarter q earnings announcement, and between the early and late forecast summarization periods, respectively. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. The analysis is restricted to firms with at least 15% good news and 15% bad news observations and at least 10 observations per firm.
(b) The models are estimated at the firm level. Coefficient estimates are the medians across 427 firms. Significance levels are based on Wilcoxon rank tests of the alternative hypothesis that the median coefficient estimate across firms differs significantly from zero. Reported p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
(c) Differences are the medians across firms in intercept and slope coefficients obtained from regressing the difference in forecast errors, FE L2 -FE L1 , on SURPRISE and RET. A negative intercept indicates α L2 <α L1 (i.e., more optimism bias in two-quarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts issued late in the period between earnings announcements). A positive slope coefficient on the SURPRISE variable indicates β L2 >β L1 (i.e., more underreaction to the implications of the quarter q earnings surprise for two-quarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts issued late in the period between earnings announcements). A positive slope coefficient on the RET variable indicates λ L2 >λ L1 (i.e., more underreaction to the implications of information in returns for twoquarter horizon versus one-quarter horizon forecasts). Late forecasts are defined as the median of the distribution of forecasts issued within 40 calendar days before the quarter q+1 earnings announcement (i.e., late in the period between the quarter q and quarter q+1 earnings announcements). RET measures returns accumulated between our early and late forecast summarization periods; i.e., from 21 days after the quarter q earnings announcement through 41 days prior to the quarter q+1 earnings announcement.
